?Takeaway: Employers should not use a general release for all medical records, but rather a release specifically related to the employee’s medical condition at issue. Such medical record requests should be consistently applied to all employees.
?A federal district court in Michigan recently held that an employer that required a fitness-for-duty examination for an employee who once said she was suicidal before it would allow her to return to work was not being retaliatory under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The plaintiff was a multimedia graphic design specialist for the Huron-Clinton Metropolitan Authority in Brighton, Mich.
In October 2017, the plaintiff filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charge against the employer, alleging retaliation stemming from her participation in a sexual-harassment investigation. In June 2018, the plaintiff faxed documents related to her EEOC charge to Huron-Clinton’s counsel. In one document, an e-mail to an EEOC investigator, the plaintiff reported feeling “suicidal” because of workplace hostility.
Concerned about the plaintiff’s mental health, the plaintiff’s supervisor placed the plaintiff on paid administrative leave and informed her that she could not return to work until she provided an authorization from a certified medical physician, indicating that she was able to safely return to the workplace and perform her job duties.
In July 2018, the plaintiff’s doctor reported that she was not fit for duty and should be re-evaluated. Six months later, the plaintiff had exhausted paid and unpaid leave, as well as the benefits provided under her collective bargaining agreement. The supervisor advised the plaintiff that if she had been cleared to return, she would need to contact the supervisor by April 5, 2019. The plaintiff did not communicate with her supervisor as required and was formally terminated.
Huron-Clinton contended that the plaintiff’s failure to fulfill the medical authorization requirement to return to work was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for her termination.
The plaintiff argued that this justification was pretextual in two ways. First, she claimed that Huron-Clinton did not act according to written policies in placing her on administrative leave and in requiring a medical certification. Second, the plaintiff claimed that Huron-Clinton misconstrued her doctor’s conclusions on her ability to return to work because her doctor never certified that she was unable to return safely to the workplace.
Pursuant to the “honest belief rule,” as long as an employer has an honest belief in its proffered nondiscriminatory reason for discharging an employee, the employee cannot establish that the reason was pretextual simply because it is ultimately shown to be incorrect.
Although Huron-Clinton did not act in accordance with written policies, the court noted that the plaintiff did not dispute that she expressed suicidal thoughts in a document disclosed to her supervisor and that she was “really distraught” during the meeting at which her supervisor placed her on administrative leave. Moreover, the plaintiff offered no evidence that her supervisor’s concerns about her mental health were disingenuous or intentionally overblown. Thus, the court concluded that at the time the plaintiff was placed on leave, she presented serious mental health concerns that reasonably required her supervisor to act, even without a written policy.
The plaintiff also insisted that her doctor never actually concluded that she was unable to return to work, making it unreasonable and pretextual for Huron-Clinton to justify her termination based on his reports. Despite indicating that the plaintiff was “no longer suicidal or having suicidal thoughts” and exhibited “significant improvement in her mental health status,” the doctor concluded in August 2018 that the plaintiff was still not psychologically fit for duty. In extending the plaintiff’s leave and insisting that she obtain a medical certification to return, Huron-Clinton acted in accordance with the only reasonable interpretation of the doctor’s opinions, the court said.
